A century ago Russia was a highly stratified society with distinct groups of aristocracy, clergy, merchants, urban intelligentsia, industrial workers and peasants. Although some degree of social mobility existed (Mironov and Eklof 2000) , the differences between social groups were clearly defined both in terms of economic resources and social status. One of the first decrees passed by the Bolsheviks in November 1917 abolished all estates, ranks and titles and proclaimed all individuals in the new Soviet Republic to be equal citizens. Following the Marxist dogma, the Bolsheviks aimed to create a classless society, in which all economic bases for social inequality would be removed. A system of 'proletarian dictatorship' was established that discriminated against members of the former privileged classes of aristocracy, clergy and bourgeoisie. Some of them died during the Civil War, but many others left Russia. According to different estimates, the number of emigrants varied between 1 and 3 million (McKeown 2004) . Some of those who stayed were prosecuted in the 1920s and 1930s.
Were the equalizing policies of the early Soviet state successful? To some extent, the answer is "yes" as the physical removal of the former privileged classes allowed rapid educational and social mobility for a considerable number of individuals with peasant and working class backgrounds (Fitzpatrick 1979) . The industrialization of the 1930s led to a massive migration of agricultural workers to cities and transformed Russia into an industrial society. On the other hand, social inequalities hardly disappeared. As early as in 1937, Trotsky noticed: "The thousand-year-old caste barriers defining the life of every man on all sides -the polished urbanite and the uncouth muzhik, the wizard of science and the day labourer -have not just been preserved from the past in a more or less softened form, but have to a considerable degree been born anew, and are assuming a more and more defiant character."
Unfortunately, there is limited data available for social researchers to quantitatively assess the inequality present in Soviet society. Official Soviet statistical publications only provide data on the proportions of workers, peasants and white-collar workers, without giving any indication of the more detailed occupational structure and degree of inequality within those groups. However, early studies based on the secondary analysis of some rudimentary statistics published in the USSR as well as qualitative evidence undoubtedly indicate the presence of considerable stratification and inequality in the post-war Soviet society (Connor 1979; Dobson 1977; Yanowitch 1977) .
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 and Russia's transition to a market economy dramatically widened existing inequalities (Gerber and Hout 1998) . In contemporary Russia income inequality is larger than in most European countries and is comparable to the US (Gorodnichenko, et al. 2010) . Status inequalities are also large, and the Soviet rhetoric on the moral value of social equality has long been abandoned.
Within a century, Russia has made a full circle: from an imperial society with its traditional structures of inequality to the equalizing Soviet experience and then to the re-emergence of substantial and visible inequality in the course of market transformation. This historical path is clearly different from other European societies, which makes Russia an interesting case to study the effect of changing institutions on the structures and extent of social inequality.
Education, occupation and intergenerational transmission of inequality in Russia
The association between parental occupational class/status and the education and occupational class/status of their children is a central problem in social stratification research. In contemporary societies, education is probably the main channel for the transmission of social advantage across generations. It is a widely established empirical fact that individuals with a more privileged social background have better access to the educational system, especially in the tertiary education sector. As education is the main factor that determines access to occupations with higher earnings and social prestige, this translates into advantages in the labour market.
Are there any other channels (apart from education) for the transmission of social advantage from parents to children? Statistically, we can establish this effect by comparing labour market What were the dynamics of the educational and occupational structure in post-Soviet Russia? The educational system in Russia is comprised of several levels. Education up to 9 th grade in secondary school is compulsory. Upon completing 9 th grade pupils can remain in secondary school for two more years and receive general secondary education or enter a vocational school.
Some vocational schools offer lower vocational education that usually lasts for two years and is mostly an educational track for certain categories of manual workers. Others offer specialized secondary degrees (four years of education as a rule) that are required for such occupations as nurses, primary school teachers, technicians, etc. One can enter higher education either after finishing 11th grade in an academic secondary school or after completing a specialized secondary degree in a vocational school (the latter is a less frequent track).
As follows from Table 1, Given the brief literature review and the descriptive analysis presented above we are led to the following hypotheses in respect to four research questions posed at the beginning of this section. First, the labour market for people with higher education may function more meritocratically.
Second, students from lower socio-economic background who reached the stage of higher education may be positively selected on ability. Third, people with higher education generally enter the labour market later in life when they are less influenced by parental control. Thus, we may expect the effect of parental background to be lower for people with higher education (question 3). Finally, previous research showed that monetary returns on education increased in Russia (Lukyanova 2010), and this is likely to be confirmed in our data. At the same time, given an increase in the proportion of people with higher education over time and a relatively stable occupational structure, returns on education in terms of occupational status may well decrease (question 4).
Data and methods
While the variables for education and occupation of respondents are available in many surveys conducted in Russia, coding parental occupation is less frequent. To examine the association between parental occupational class/status, children's education and occupational class/status, we collected data from all the surveys where parental occupation was coded. ISEI was coded first with the father's occupation; if it was missing, the mother's occupation was used. For education, the surveys applied different classifications, and hence education was recoded into a standardized variable with six levels (see descriptive statistics in Table 3 ). The educational distribution in the sample is close to the census data (Table 1) , although people with higher education are somewhat overrepresented and people with lower levels of education are underrepresented. Post-stratification survey weights were applied 3 .
The dependent variables in the analysis are ISEI and earnings. ISEI was coded with current occupation, as the information on the first job of respondents was not available in the surveys.
Not every survey in the data set had a variable for earnings, and the analytical sample size for the analysis of earnings is smaller (n=16,752). I took a logarithm of earnings and standardized logged earnings for each survey with the mean of zero and the standard deviation of one. A very small number of observations with zero earnings were dropped. The independent variables include education, parental ISEI, sex, age, and year of the survey (or period).
As the data are a collection of different surveys, I essentially conduct a meta-analysis. To account for the differences in estimated coefficients between surveys and across time, I used multilevel models with random intercepts and random slopes for parental ISEI. In further analysis, to estimate the effect of parental background across the distribution of earnings I applied quantile regression (Hao and Naiman 2007).
Results
The first step in the analysis was to calculate bivariate correlation coefficients between respondents' and parental ISEI, parental ISEI and respondents' education, and respondents' education and ISEI, separately for each survey in the data set (presented in Table 4 ). As To test these findings more rigorously and control for potential confounders, I apply the multilevel regression framework. The results for models with ISEI as the dependent variable are reported in Table 5 . Model 1.1 estimates the effect of parental ISEI after controlling for the potentially non-linear effect of age. The regression coefficient for parental ISEI is 0.31, which is close to the correlation coefficient of 0.28 reported in Table 4 (as it should be given that the variances of parental and respondents' ISEI are about the same). Interestingly, age does not have much effect on ISEI. Model 1.2 adds education, and the regression coefficient for parental ISEI drops to 0.11, but remains statistically significant. Model 1.3 adds sex and the interaction effect between sex and parental ISEI. As expected, average ISEI for men is lower than for women, and the effect of parental ISEI is somewhat weaker for men than for women (by 0.03). The standard deviation for the random slope for the effects of parental ISEI is not very large (about 0.03). This is consistent with relatively stable correlation coefficients for own and parental ISEI in Table 4 . The unexplained residual variance drops after including education in the model and does not change much after adding sex, year, and the interaction effects. Table 6 Finally, I applied quantile regression to the RLMS data to test if the effect of parental background differs across the distribution of earnings (Table 7) . In this case, I did not take the logarithm of earnings. The analysis shows that the variance of earnings is larger for people with higher parental occupational status (and also for men and people with higher education). We see indeed that the effect of parental background is stronger at higher earnings percentiles. At the 10 th percentile, a 40-point difference in parental ISEI corresponds to the difference in monthly earnings of 388 rubles (about 11 euro, applying the official exchange rate of 30 December 2006), after controlling for education, sex and age. At the median, this difference increases to 1,100 rubles (about 32 euro) and at the 90 th percentile to 2,056 rubles (about 59 euro). This is not a trivial effect size, given that median monthly earnings and the interquartile range in our sample equal 6000 rubles.
Discussion
As expected, there is a statistically significant effect of parental occupational status on respondents' occupational status and earnings, even after controlling for the level of education.
The average effect of parental ISEI on respondents' ISEI after controlling for education in Russia is 0.11 (0.12 for women and 0.09 for men). This is close to the estimates reported for other European countries in the EDUREU project. The intergeneration heredity of occupational positions seems to be about as strong in Russia as in other European countries, despite very different historical trajectories and institutional legacies.
Considering the second research question, there was no time trend in the strength of the association between respondents' and their parents' occupational status, as well as between parental occupational status and respondents' earnings (controlling for education, age and sex).
This contradicts earlier findings about decreased social fluidity in post-Soviet Russia, reported by Gerber and Hout (2004) . The present analysis was based on a much larger data set compared to Gerber and Hout's study and included five out of six surveys that they used (data from the sixth survey were not available). If we look at the surveys used by Gerber and Hout that are also present in the data set, the coefficients of correlation between parental and respondents' ISEI in the surveys conducted in 1990-92 are indeed somewhat lower than in 1993, 1998 and 1999 (see Table 4 ). However, if more recent data are taken into account, there is not enough evidence that the association between social origins and destinations strengthened in the late 1990s and 2000s compared to the early 1990s. The difference in the correlation coefficients between the first two surveys in the data set and other surveys is also rather weak and is likely to be spurious.
In their analysis, Gerber and Hout applied log-multiplicative models for contingency tables of parental and respondents' social class, while my findings are based on simple correlation and regression models, in which occupational status was operationalized as ISEI. Studies based on statistical methods for categorical and interval data may in principle give contradictory results.
The question on whether social fluidity did indeed decrease in Russia in the post-Soviet period remains open until Gerber and Hout's study is replicated with our larger data set using statistical methods for contingency tables standard in modern social mobility research.
There were no significant differences in the effect of parental background across educational levels. It has been argued before that the effect for people with higher education may be weaker, as the labour market for non-manual occupations is more meritocratic. Also, among people with lower socio-economic background there may be positive selection to higher education on ability (Bernardi 2012 ). The Russian data do not provide confirmation for this hypothesis.
Bernardi (2012) discussed several mechanisms that may be responsible for the intergenerational transmission of social advantage outside the educational system. These are differential selection of the field of study, unobserved cognitive and non-cognitive skills (correlated with both parental background and their children's occupation and earnings), and the differences in job matching mechanisms among graduates with different socio-economic background. In the data set I do not have the information required to test any of these mechanisms and have to restrict myself to the description of basic facts about the effects of parental background rather than explain the mechanisms involved.
However, one mechanism deserves a separate discussion in the Russian case. A large body of literature deals with the role of informal mechanisms in the process of job search in Russia.
While using social networks for a job search is common in many countries (Granovetter 1973) , it was argued that for Russia networking is particularly important (Ledeneva 1998 
